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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Following a bench trial, the district court found fifty-year-old Silvanna Finnerty 
guilty of felony possession of a controlled substance.  The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspended the sentence, and 
placed Ms. Finnerty on probation for a period of two years.  On appeal, Ms. Finnerty 
asserts the evidence presented was insufficient to support her conviction. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Ms. Finnerty committed the crime of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, felony, in violation of 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1).  (R., pp.24-25.)  After Ms. Finnerty waived a preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate bound her over to the district court.  (R., pp.53-54.)  The State 
then filed an Information charging Ms. Finnerty with the above offense.1  (R., pp.55-56.)  
Ms. Finnerty entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.59.)   
 The case proceeded to a bench trial upon Ms. Finnerty’s request.  (See 
R., pp.82-86.)  Sergeant Aaron Flynn with the Bonner County Sheriff’s Office testified 
that, while on patrol around midnight, he conducted a traffic stop on a car driven by 
Ms. Finnerty after seeing the car cross the fog line.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.6, L.25 – p.9, 
L.7.)  Ms. Finnerty was the only person in the car.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.9, Ls.1-7.)  
Sergeant Flynn testified Ms. Finnerty was sluggish to respond to his commands and 
passed over the license, registration, and proof of insurance documents he requested 
                                            
1 The State later filed an Amended Information charging the same offense.  (R., pp.62-
63.) 
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while she was searching for them.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.9, Ls.13-24.)  Ms. Finnerty told 
the officer she did not drink.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.9, Ls.24-25.)  However, Sergeant 
Flynn suspected Ms. Finnerty was impaired.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.10, Ls.2-11.) 
 The sergeant testified he asked Ms. Finnerty several questions, and during that 
conversation he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.10, Ls.12-
18.)  By that time, Deputy Alex Hughes had arrived at the scene and also smelled the 
odor of burnt marijuana coming from the car.  (See Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.10, Ls.20-23.)  
Sergeant Flynn performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on Ms. Finnerty, and he 
did not see any nystagmus that would indicate alcohol impairment.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, 
p.11, Ls.17-24.)  Ms. Finnerty told him she was on several medications.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 
2014, p.11, Ls.24-25.)  Sergeant Flynn had Deputy Hughes search the car based on the 
odor of burnt marijuana, and after the horizontal nystagmus test Deputy Hughes 
reported he found methamphetamine in the vehicle.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.12, Ls.2-7.)  
Sergeant Flynn then arrested Ms. Finnerty for possession of narcotics.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 
2014, p.12, Ls.8-10.) 
 Sergeant Flynn testified he read Ms. Finnerty her Miranda rights,2 and 
Ms. Finnerty denied knowing where the methamphetamine came from.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 
2014, p.12, Ls.14-19.)  The methamphetamine was packaged for evidence and 
submitted to the State lab for testing.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.1.) 
 On cross-examination, Sergeant Flynn testified a Risperidone pill was also found 
in the car.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.18, Ls.11-22.)  On redirect examination, the sergeant 
testified Deputy Hughes gave him the methamphetamine at the scene.  (See 
                                            
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.19, Ls.18-20.)  The State had the evidence envelope containing the 
methamphetamine marked as State’s Exhibit 1 for identification.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, 
p.19, L.21 – p.22, L.24.)  On recross examination, Sergeant Flynn testified Deputy 
Hughes field tested the methamphetamine, and the results were presumptively positive 
for methamphetamine.  (See Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.23, Ls.12-16.) 
 Deputy Hughes testified that when he was assisting Sergeant Flynn with the 
traffic stop, he approached the passenger side of Ms. Finnerty’s car and smelled the 
odor of burnt marijuana coming from the car.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.24, Ls.12-17, p.25, 
L.9 – p.26, L.8.)  Deputy Hughes explained what he had smelled to Ms. Finnerty, and 
she told him her male friend had smoked marijuana in the car earlier that day.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.26, Ls.16-19.)  After Sergeant Flynn told Deputy Hughes to search 
the car, the deputy saw a little black canister on the passenger floorboard.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 
2014, Ls.2-13.)  He opened the canister and found a plastic bag inside that contained a 
crystal like substance that he thought was methamphetamine.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, 
Ls.13-17.)  Deputy Hughes testified the only thing on the passenger floorboard was the 
canister, and it stood out.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.27, Ls.18-24.)  He then gave the 
canister and its contents to Sergeant Flynn.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.27, L.25 – p.28, L.3.)  
 On cross-examination, Deputy Hughes testified he arrived on the scene within a 
couple minutes after Sergeant Flynn started the traffic stop.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.30, 
L.20 – p.31, L.3.)  He also testified he did not believe he field tested the substance.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.32, Ls.16-21.) 
David Sincerbeaux, a forensic scientist at the Idaho State Police Forensic 
Laboratory, testified that he tested the substance in State’s Exhibit 1 and the test results 
 4 
showed the substance contained methamphetamine.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.47, Ls.7-13, 
p.49, L.12 – p.50, L.8, p.58, Ls.1-4.)  The State admitted State’s Exhibit 1 into evidence.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.60, L.23 – p.61, L.1.) 
Ms. Finnerty testified she was on disability for physical and medical conditions, 
and that she had permanent physical injuries to her back and neck.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, 
p.34, Ls.9-21.)  She was on Risperdal, Trazodone, Hydrocodone, and Benefexor, and 
had taken them the day of the incident.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.34, L.22 – p.35, L.7.)  
Ms. Finnerty testified she was not really supposed to drive on those medications.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.35, Ls.8-9.) 
 Ms. Finnerty testified that when Sergeant Flynn pulled her over, he stated he 
stopped her because he smelled some marijuana and she crossed the fog line.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.35, Ls.11-24.)  He then asked Ms. Finnerty if she had a brain 
injury.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.36, Ls.2-8.)  Ms. Finnerty told Sergeant Flynn that she 
might have had a brain injury, that she was taking medications for it, and that she was 
disabled and handicapped.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.36, Ls.9-15.)  Sergeant Flynn took her 
driver’s license to check it and then asked her to step out the car.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, 
p.36, Ls.19-24.)  When Ms. Finnerty stepped out of the car, Sergeant Flynn had her do 
a sobriety test while the other officer searched her car.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.37, Ls.2-
13.)   
Ms. Finnerty testified Deputy Hughes was not at the scene during the incident.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.37, Ls.14-19.)  The other officer told her he smelled something, 
and she made a joke it was somebody in the car that morning because she did not 
smoke marijuana.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.37, L.24 – p.38, L.14.)  Ms. Finnerty testified 
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she did not know anything about the methamphetamine found in the car, and that it was 
not her methamphetamine.  (Tr. Oct. 17, 2014, p.38, Ls.15-20.)  She was arrested later 
that night and taken to jail.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.38, L.21 – p.39, L.7.)  Ms. Finnerty did 
not know whose methamphetamine it was.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.41, Ls.14-18.)  She 
testified she could not see at all at night.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.41, Ls.18-19.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Finnerty again testified it was a joke that somebody 
had smoked marijuana in her car earlier, and it was funny to her because she does not 
smoke marijuana.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.42, Ls.3-8.)  Nobody had smoked in her car.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.42, Ls.9-11.)  Ms. Finnerty had owned the car since 2012.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.42, Ls.14-16.) 
In its closing argument, the State contended “that the facts show that . . . the 
defendant was stopped legitimately, a search was conducted, she was found to be in 
possession of the methamphetamine which was confirmed by the laboratory analyst . . . 
so the State would submit that it has satisfied its burden beyond a reasonable doubt . . . 
.”  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.61, Ls.12-21.)  Ms. Finnerty did not offer any closing argument.  
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.61, Ls.22-23.)  The district court then reached the following 
conclusion: 
Ms. Finnerty, I have to find on a reasonable doubt standard or I don’t have 
to find.  I do find on a reasonable doubt standard that you are guilty of the 
offense of possession of a controlled substance methamphetamine. 
 
You were stopped.  You were the only person in the car.  You admitted 
that you had the car for a couple of years.  You were the owner.  And 
there was methamphetamine found in a black canister that was right on 
the floor of the passenger seat.  The Officer testified it was pretty easy to 
see.  And under the law, if you’re the only person in the vehicle and it’s 




So I find that the State has met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The Court is convinced from the evidence that was presented that it was, 
in fact, methamphetamine. 
 
(Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.61, L.24 – p.62, L.16 (emphasis added).) 
 At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose 
a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspend the sentence, and place 
Ms. Finnerty on probation for a period of three years.  (Tr., Dec. 15, 2014, p.4, L.17 – 
p.5, L.2.)  Ms. Finnerty recommended that the district court impose a unified sentence of 
three years, with one year fixed, suspend the sentence, and place her on probation for a 
period of two years.  (Tr., Dec. 15, 2014, p.6, Ls.6-11.)  The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspended the sentence, and 
placed Ms. Finnerty on probation for a period of two years.  (R., pp.96-103.) 
 Ms. Finnerty filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Felony 
Judgment (Probation).  (R., pp.107-09.) 
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ISSUE 
Was the evidence presented insufficient to support Ms. Finnerty’s conviction for 




The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Support Ms. Finnerty’s Conviction For 
Possession Of A Controlled Substance 
 
A. Introduction  
 Ms. Finnerty asserts that the evidence presented at her bench trial was 
insufficient to support her conviction for possession of a controlled substance.  
Specifically, there was insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could 
have found that the State met its burden of proving that Ms. Finnerty knowingly 
possessed the methamphetamine. 
   
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.  State v. 
Taylor, 157 Idaho 186, 189 (2014).  “When a criminal action has been tried to a court 
sitting without a jury, appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to 
ascertaining whether there is substantial evidence upon which the court could have 
found that the prosecution met its burden of proving the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Wright, 154 Idaho 157, 158 (Ct. App. 2013).  
Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion.”  Taylor, 157 Idaho at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“[T]he Court is required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
but will not substitute its judgment for that of the [trier of fact] on issues of witness 
credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires that a conviction be supported by legally sufficient evidence.  See 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979).  Sufficient evidence is “evidence 
necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of 
every element of the offense.”  Id. at 316.   
 Ms. Finnerty was tried under I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), which provides that generally 
“[i]t is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance,” and that possession 
of a schedule II controlled substance such as methamphetamine is a felony.  (See 
Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.58, Ls.5-6, p.61, Ls.12-21.)  The district court stated, “under the 
law, if you’re the only person in the vehicle and it’s your vehicle, you are deemed to be 
in possession of anything in that vehicle.”  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.62, Ls.9-12.)  However, 
the district court’s description of the applicable law was incomplete.  It is well-settled in 
Idaho that “[i]n order to secure a conviction for possession of methamphetamine in 
violation of I.C. § 27-2732(c), the State must prove that the defendant knowingly 
possessed the controlled substance, i.e., that the defendant had knowledge of the 
presence of a drug.”  State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 241-42 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993); 
State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 151 (Ct. App. 1999)) (emphasis in original).  “The 
requisite knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance may be proved by direct 
evidence or may be inferred from the circumstances.”  Id. at 65. 
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C. There Was Insufficient Evidence Upon Which A Reasonable Trier Of Fact Could 
Have Found The State Met Its Burden Of Proving Ms. Finnerty Knowingly 
Possessed The Methamphetamine 
 
In this case, the evidence presented was insufficient to support Ms. Finnerty’s 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, because there was insufficient 
evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the State met its 
burden of proving Ms. Finnerty knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. 
Deputy Hughes testified he saw the canister containing the methamphetamine on 
the front passenger floorboard of Ms. Finnerty’s car.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.27, Ls.10-
14.)  The deputy testified “the only thing on the passenger floorboard was that canister 
that I can remember and it wasn’t very big so it stood out.”  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.27, 
Ls.22-24.)  However, Ms. Finnerty testified that Deputy Hughes was not even at the 
scene.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.37, Ls.14-18.)  Further, Ms. Finnerty testified she did not 
know anything about the methamphetamine, and that the methamphetamine was not 
hers.  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.38, Ls.15-20.)  Additionally, when asked whose 
methamphetamine it was, Ms. Finnerty testified: “I don’t know.  I can’t see on the other 
side.  I can’t see at all at night, someone comes to my car.”  (Tr., Oct. 17, 2014, p.41, 
Ls.16-19.) 
In light of the above testimony, there was insufficient evidence upon which a 
reasonable trier of fact could have found that the State met its burden of proving that 
Ms. Finnerty knowingly possessed the methamphetamine.  See Wright, 154 Idaho at 
158; Armstrong, 142 Idaho at 64.  Thus, the evidence presented was insufficient to 
support Ms. Finnerty’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance.  See Taylor, 




For the above reasons, Ms. Finnerty respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. 
 DATED this 15th day of January, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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